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Abstract
The rapid worldwide spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) demonstrated the potential
threat an infectious disease poses in a closely interconnected and interdependent world. Here we introduce a
probabilistic model which describes the worldwide spreading of infectious diseases and demonstrate that a
forecast of the geographical spread of epidemics is indeed possible. It combines a stochastic local infection
dynamics between individuals with stochastic transport in a worldwide network which takes into account
the national and international civil aviation traffic. Our simulations of the SARS outbreak are in suprisingly
good agreement with published case reports. We show that the high degree of predictability is caused by the
strong heterogeneity of the network. Our model can be used to predict the worldwide spreading of future
infectious diseases and to identify endangered regions in advance. The performance of different control
strategies is analyzed and our simulations show that a quick and focused reaction is essential to inhibit the
global spreading of epidemics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The application of mathematical modeling to the spread of epidemics has a long history and
was initiated by Daniel Bernoulli’s work on the effect of cow-pox inoculation on the spread of
smallpox in 1760[1]. Most studies concentrate on the local temporal development of diseases and
epidemics. Their geographical spread is less well understood, although important progress has
been achieved in a number of case studies [2, 3, 4]. The key question and difficulty is how to
include spatial effects and to quantify the dispersal of individuals. This problem has been stud-
ied with some effort in various ecological systems, for instance in plant dispersal by seeds [5].
Today’s volume, speed and non-locality of human travel (Fig. 1) and the rapid worldwide spread
of SARS (Fig. 2) demonstrate that modern epidemics cannot be accounted for by local diffusion
models which are only applicable as long as the mean distance traveled by individuals is small
compared to geographical extents. These local reaction-diffusion models generically lead to epi-
demic wavefronts, which were observed for example in the geotemporal spread of the Black Death
in Europe from 1347-50 [6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
Here we focus on mechanisms of the worldwide spreading of infectious diseases. Our model
consists of two parts: a local infection dynamics and the global traveling dynamics of individuals
similar to the models investigated in [11]. However, both constituents of our model are treated on a
stochastic level, taking full account of fluctuations of disease transmission, latency and recovery on
one hand, and fluctuations of the geographical dispersal of individuals on the other. Furthermore
we incorporate nearly the entire civil aviation network.
II. LOCAL INFECTION DYNAMICS
In the standard deterministic SIR model for infectious diseases, a population withN individuals
is categorized according to its infection status: susceptibles (S), infectious (I) or recovered and
immune (R)[6, 12]. The dynamics which specifies the flow among these categories is given by
ds/dt = −α s j, dj/dt = α s j − β j , (1)
where s = S/N and j = I/N denote the relative number of susceptibles and infecteds, respec-
tively. The relative number of recovered individuals r = R/N is obtained by conservation of the
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Figure 1: Global aviation network. A geographical representation of the civil aviation traffic among
the 500 largest international airports in over 100 different countries is shown. Each line represents
a direct connection between airports. The color encodes the number of passengers per day (see
color code at the bottom) traveling between two airports. The network accounts for more than
95% of the international civil aviation traffic. For each pair (i, j) of airports, we checked all flights
departing from airport j and arriving at airport i. The amount of passengers carried by a specific
flight within one week can be estimated by the size of the aircraft (We used manufacturer capacity
information on over 150 different aircraft types) times the number of days the flight operates in one
week. The sum of all flights yields the passengers per week, i.e. Mij in Eq. (7). We computed the
total passenger capacity ∑Mij of each airport j per week and found very good agreement with
independently obtained airport capacities.
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entire population, i.e. r(t) = 1−j(t)−s(t), and τ = β−1 is the average infectious period. The key
quantity describing the infection is the basic reproduction number ρ0 = α/β, which is the average
number of secondary infections transmitted by an infectious individual in an otherwise uninfected
population. If ρ0 > 1 and the initial relative number of susceptibles is greater than a critical value
sc = 1/ρ0 an epidemic develops (dj/dt > 0). As the number of infected individuals increases, the
fraction of susceptibles s decreases and thus the number of contacts of infected individuals withfig
susceptibles decreases until s = sc when the epidemic reaches its maximum and subsequently
decays.
The above SIR model incorporates the underlying mechanism of transmission and recovery
dynamics and has been able to account for experimental data in a number of cases. However,
transmission of and recovery from an infection are intrinsically stochastic processes and the deter-
ministic SIR model does not account for fluctuations. These fluctuations are particularly important
at the beginning of an epidemic when the number of infecteds is very small.
In this regime a probabilistic description must be used. Schematically the stochastic infection
dynamics is given by
S + I
α−→ 2 I, I β−→ ∅ . (2)
The first reaction reflects the fact that an encounter of an infected individual with a susceptible
results in two infecteds at a probability rate α, the second indicates that infecteds are removed
(recover) at a rate β and effectively disappear from the population. The quantity of interest is the
probability p(S, I; t) of finding a number S of susceptibles and I infecteds in a population of size
N at time t. Assuming that the process is Markovian on the relevant time scales, the dynamics of
this probability is governed by the master equation [13]
∂t p(S, I; t) =
α
N
(S + 1) (I − 1) p(S + 1, I − 1; t) + β (I + 1) p(S, I + 1; t)
−
( α
N
SI p− β I
)
p(S, I; t) . (3)
In addition to this dynamics one must specify the initial condition p(S, I; t = t0) which is typically
assumed to be a small but fixed number of infecteds I0, i.e. p(S, I; t = t0) = δI,I0δS,N−I0.
The relation of the probabilistic master equation (3) to the deterministic SIR-model (1) can be
made in the limit of a large but finite population, i.e. N ≫ 1. In this limit one can approximate
the master equation by a Fokker-Planck equation by means of an expansion in terms of condi-
tional moments (Kramers-Moyal expansion [13]), see the supplement material. The associated
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description in terms of stochastic Langevin equations reads
ds/dt = −α s j + 1√
N
√
α s jξ1(t) (4)
dj/dt = αs j − β j − 1√
N
√
α s jξ1(t) +
1√
N
√
β jξ2(t) (5)
Here, the independent Gaussian white noise forces ξ1(t) and ξ2(t) reflect the fluctuations of trans-
mission and recovery, respectively. Note that the magnitude of the fluctuations are ∝ 1/√N and
disappear in the limit N → ∞ in which case Eqs. (1) are recovered. However, for large but finite
N a crucial difference is apparent: Eqs. (4) and (5) contain fluctuating forces and N is a param-
eter of the system. A careful analysis shows that even for very large populations (i.e. N ≫ 1)
fluctuations play a prominent role in the initial phase of an epidemic outbreak and cannot be ne-
glected. For instance even when ρ0 > 0, a small initial number of infecteds in a population may
no necessarily lead to an outbreak which cannot be accounted for by the deterministic model.
III. DISPERSAL ON THE AVIATION NETWORK
As individuals travel around the world, the disease may spread from one place to another. In
order to quantify the traveling behavior of individuals, we have analyzed all national and interna-
tional civil flights among the 500 largest airports by passenger capacity. This analysis yields the
global aviation network shown in Fig. 1, further details of the data collection is compiled in the
supplement material. The strength of a connection between two airports is given by the passengers
capacity, i.e. the number of passengers that travel this route per day.
We incorporate the global dispersion of individuals into our model by dividing the population
into M local urban populations labeled i containing Ni individuals. For each i the number of
susceptibles, infecteds individuals is given by Si and Ii, respectively. In each urban area the
infection dynamics is governed by the master equation (3).
Stochastic dispersal of individuals is defined by a matrix γij of transition probability rates
between populations
Si
γij−→ Sj Ii γij−→ Ij, i, j = 1, ...,M , (6)
where γii = 0. Along the same lines as presented above one can formulate a master equation for
the pair of vectors X = {S1, I1, ..., SM , IM} which defines the stochastic state of the system. This
master equation is provided explicitely in supplement material.
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In order to account for the global spread of an epidemic via the aviation network one needs to
specify the matrix γij . Since the global exchange of individuals between urban areas is carried
out by airborne travel one can estimate the probability rate matrix γij by t. We assume that an
individual remains in urban area for some time before traveling to another region. A flight j → i
is chosen according to the weights
wij = Mij/
∑
i
Mij . (7)
where Mij is the number of passengers per unit time that depart from an airport in region j and
arrive at airport in region i. The matrix w accounts for the overall connectivity of the aviation
network as well as for the heterogeneity in the strength of the connections. Denoting the typical
time period individuals remain at i by τi the matrix γij is expressed in terms of wij according to
γij = wij/τj . If we assume that each airport is surrounded by a catchment area with a population
Ni the typical time individuals remain at i is given by τi = Ni/
∑
j Mji. If the capacity of airport
i reflects the need of the associated catchment area (i.e. Ni ∝
∑
j Mji), the waiting times τi are
identical for all i, i.e. τi = τ = γ−1 which implies γij = γ wij . In our model the global rate γ
is a free parameter. In order to verify the its validity, we apply our model to the SARS outbreak.
The rate γ can be computed from the ratio of the number of infected individuals in Hong Kong to
the number of infected individuals outside Hong Kong, which is provided by the WHO data. For
the local infection dynamics we use a simple extension of the above stochastic SIR model: The
categories S, I and R are completed by a category L of latent individuals which have been infected
but are not infectious yet themselves, accounting for the latency of the disease. In our simulations
individuals remain in the latent or infectious stage for periods drawn from the delay distribution
provided in Fig. 2 in [14]. In our simulation we chose random infection times the distribution of
which is known for SARS [14]. In a realistic simulation the basic reproduction number ρ0 cannot
be assumed to be constant over time. Successful control measures, for instance, generally decrease
ρ0. We chose a time dependent ρ0(t) as provided by Refs. [15, 16].
IV. RESULTS OF SIMULATIONS
Fig. 2 depicts a geographical representation of the results of our simulations. Initially, an
infected individual was placed in Hong Kong. For this initial condition we simulated 1000 real-
izations of the stochastic model and computed the mean value 〈I(t)〉 of the number of infecteds
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Figure 2: (a) Geographical representation of the global spreading of probable SARS cases on
May 30th, 2003 as reported by the WHO and CDC. The first cases of SARS emerged in mid
November 2002 in Guangdong Province, China[17]. The disease was then carried to Hong Kong
on the February 21st, 2003 and began spreading around the world along international air travel
routes, as tourists and the medical doctors who treated the early cases traveled internationally.
As the disease moved out of southern China, the first hot zones of SARS were Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore, Hanoi (Viet Nam) and Toronto (Canada), but soon cases in Taiwan, Thailand, the United
States, Europe and elsewhere were reported. (a) Geographical representation of the results of
our simulations 90 days after an initial infection in Hong Kong, The simulation corresponds to the
real SARS infection at the end of May, 2003. Since our Since the simulations cannot describe
the infection in China, where the disease started in November 2002, we used the WHO data for
China.
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at each node i = 1, ...,M of the network. Since the size of catchment areas varies on many
scales, the fluctuation range is best quantied by the means of the relative variance of z = log I ,
i.e. η =
√
〈z2〉 − 〈z〉2/ < z > . In our simulations we computed this measure for every i of the
network. Fig 2 shows the prediction of our model for the spread of SARS at t = 90 days after
the initial outbreak in Hong Kong (February 19, 2003), corresponding to the May 20, 2003. The
results of our simulations are in remarkable agreement with the worldwide spreading of SARS as
reported by the WHO (compare Fig. 2): There is an almost one-to-one correspondence between
infected countries as predicted by the simulations and the WHO data.
Also the orders of magnitude of the numbers of infected individuals in a country agree (Ta-
ble I). While for most countries the reported cases by the WHO lie within the fluctuation range,
two deviation between the reported cases and the predictions of the simulation are apparent: Our
simulations predict a relatively high number of SARS cases in Japan (between 26.6 and 137.0).
However, the Japanese Government reported no confirmed case (only 5 suspected cases) of SARS
in Japan, as of May 30, 2003. How a single realization may deviate from the expectation can be
seen from the difference between the simulation and the reported cases in the USA and Canada.
The simulations show that on average the USA should have a higher number of SARS cases than
Canada, although the opposite was reported by the WHO. The impact of the inherent stochasticity
of the infection and traveling dynamics is discussed in the next section.
V. THE IMPACT OF FLUCTUATIONS
Bearing in mind the low number of infections and the small value of ρ0 for SARS, the high de-
gree of predictability, i.e. the low impact of fluctuations on the network level, is rather surprising,
especially because our simulations take into account the full spectrum of fluctuations of disease
transmission, recovery and dispersal and that the system evolves on a highly complex network.
Naively, one expects that dispersal fluctuations between two given populations are amplified as
the epidemic spreads globally and that no prediction can be made. In order to clarify this impor-
tant point, consider the system of two confined populations A and B which exchange individuals
as depicted in Fig. 3. For simplicity we assume that both populations have the same size (i.e.
NA = NB = N) and individuals traverse at a rate γ. Now assume that initially a small number of
infected I0 is introduced to population A without any infecteds contained in B. For a sufficiently
high number of infecteds in A an epidemic occurs. For γ > 0 infecteds are introduced to B and a
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Country WHO WHO Simulation
05/20/2003 05/30/2003 Average η Min Max
Hong Kong 1718 1739 1951 0.35 1373.9 2770.4
Taiwan 383 676 318.2 0.55 184.0 550.3
Singapore 206 206 136.6 0.68 69.4 268.7
Japan - - 60.4 0.84 26.6 137.0
Canada 140 188 41.8 0.94 16.4 106.6
USA 67 66 65.9 0.84 28.4 152.7
Vietnam 63 63 49.2 0.86 20.7 116.3
Philippines 12 12 30.0 0.97 6.2 50.7
Germany 9 10 14.4 1.1 4.8 43.1
Netherlands - - 5.9 1.09 2.0 17.6
Bangladesh - - 10 1.15 3.2 31.6
Mongolia 9 9 - - - -
Italy 9 9 5.3 1.02 1.9 14.6
Thailand 8 8 35.4 0.89 14.5 86.8
France 7 7 7.6 1.09 2.6 22.6
Australia 6 6 27.0 1.05 10.1 72.5
Malaysia 7 5 17.7 1.05 6.2 50.7
United Kingdom 4 4 16.7 1.04 5.9 47.0
Table I: A comparison of the SARS case reports provided by the WHO and the results of our
simulation for all countries with a reported case number ≥ 4. The expected number of infecteds
predicted by our model is estimated by the average over 1000 realizations of the stochastic model.
The epidemic was simulation for t = 90 days after the initial outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong
(February 19, 2003), yielding a simulation end of May 20, 2003. The range defined by column 6
and 7 was computed by means of the fluctuation measure η (see text) which is approximately one
for all countries.
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Figure 3: Two confined populations with exchange of individuals. In each population the dynamics
is governed by the SIR-reaction scheme (6). Individuals travel from on population to the other at
a rate γ. Parameters are NA = NB = 10, 000, R0 = 4 and an initial number of infecteds I0 = 20 in
population A Left: The probability p(γ) of an outbreak occurring in population B as a function of
transition rate γ. The insets depict histograms of the time lag T between the outbreaks in A and B
for those realization for which an outbreak occurs in B. The circles are results of the simulations of
100, 000 realizations, the solid curve is the analytic result of Eq. (8) Right: A star-shaped network
with a central population A connected to M − 1 populations B1, ..., BM−1with rates γ1, ..., γM−1.
The cumulated variance (Eq. ??) for a star network with 32 populations is depicted as a function of
the average transmission rate γ¯. Two cases are exemplified: equal rates (circles) and distributed
rates according to Eq. 10 with γmax/γmin ≈ 1000 (squares). The solid lines show the analytical
results given by Eq. 9 and Eq. 8. Parameters are NA = NB = 10, 000, R0 = 4 and an initial
number of infecteds I0 = 20 in population A. The numerical values are obtained by calculating
the variance of the fluctuations of 100 different realizations of the epidemic outbreak for each γ¯.
subsequent outbreak may occur in B after a time lag T . Fig. 3 depicts the results of simulations
for two populations with N = 10, 000 and ρ0 = 4. Various realizations of the time course IA(t)
and IB(t) of the epidemic in both populations we computed. The initial number of infecteds in
population was IA(t = 0) = I0 = 20. The left panel depicts the probability p(γ) of an outbreak
occuring in population B as a function if the transition rate γ. For large enough rates the proba-
bility is nearly unity, since a sufficient number of infecteds is introduced to B. For very low rates
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γ no infecteds are introduced to B during the time span of the epidemic in A and thus p(γ) → 0
as γ → 0. For intermediate values of γ the probability p(γ) is neither one nor unity and the time
course in population B cannot be predicted with certainty. The function p(γ) is given by
p(γ) = 1− exp(−γ/γ⋆), (8)
where the critical rate γ⋆ is a function of the parameters ρ0 and N . The insets depict histograms
of the time lag T for those realization for which an outbreak occured in B. Each histogram
corresponds to a different transition rate γ. The smaller γ the higher the variability in T . Note that
even in a range in which p(γ) ≈ 1, the time lag T is still a stochastic quantity with a high degree
of variance (see also the supplement material).
Consequently, the introduction of stochastic exchange of infected individuals leads to a lack of
predictability in the time of onset of the initially uninfected population. In the light of the analysis
of two populations, the predictability in the case of SARS on the aviation network seems even
more puzzling.
The situation changes drastically in networks which exhibits a high degree of variability in the
rate matrix γij . Clearly, this is the case for the aviation network. Consider the simple network
depicted in Fig. 3. Each population contains N individuals. A central population A is coupled to
a set of M − 1 surrounding populations B1, ...BM−1. Assume that initially a number of infecteds
I0 is introduced to the central population A such that an outbreak occurs. The entire set of rates
{γj} j=1,...,M−1 determines the behaviour in the surrounding populations. If all rates γj are identical
and very small we expect no infection to occur in theBj , for large enough γj an outbreak will occur
in every Bj . In the aviation network, however, transition rates are distributed on many scales and
the response of the network to a central outbreak depends on the statistical properties of this
distribution denoted byq(γ). In order to quantify the reaction of the network we introduce for each
surrounding population a binary number ξj with j = 1, ...,M − 1 which is unity if an outbreak
occurs in Bj and zero if it doesn’t. According to Eq. (8) for a given rate γ this quantity is a random
number with a conditional probability density p(ξi|γ) = (1 − p(γ)) δ(ξi) + p(γ) δ(ξi − 1). The
variability of the network is thence quantified be the cumulative variance per population and we
define
σ =
4
M − 1
∑
i
var(ξi) =
∫
dγ p(γ) (1− p(γ)) q(γ) (9)
as a measure for the uncertainty of the network response. If for example q(γ) = δ(γ − γ¯), i.e.
all transition rate are identical and equal to γ¯, then σ(γ¯) = 4 p(γ¯)(1 − p(γ¯), which is unity for
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p(γ¯) = 1/2. Comparing with Eq. (8) we see that when ¯γ = γ⋆ log 2 the system with identical
transition rates γi = γ¯ exhibits the highest degree of unpredictability when the rates are of the
order of the critical rate defined by (8). The function σ(γ¯) is shown in Fig. 3.
Now assume that the rate γj are drawn from a distribution
q(γ) =
1
log(γmax/γmin)
1
γ
γmax ≤ γ ≤ γmin. (10)
which implies a high degree of variance within the interval [γmin, γmax] (i.e. γj is distributed uni-
formly on a logarithmic scale). This high variability in rates drastically changes the predictability
of the system. Inserting into Eq. (9) yields σ(γ¯) for strongly distributed rates. In Fig. 3 this func-
tion is compared to a system of identical transition rates. On one hand, for intermediate values of
γ ≈ γ⋆ the predictability is much higher than in the system of identical rates. This is a rather coun-
terintuitive result. Despite the additional randomness in transition rates, the degree of determinism
is increased.
VI. CONTROL STRATEGIES
Fig. 4 exemplify how our model can be employed to predict endangered regions if the origin of
a future epidemic is located quickly. The figure depict simulations of the global spread of SARS
at t = 90 days after hypothetical outbreaks in New York and London, respectively. Despite the
worldwide spread of the epidemic in each case, the degree of infection of each country differs
considerably, which has important consequences for control strategies.
Vaccination of a fraction of the population reduces the fraction of susceptibles and thus yields
a smaller effective reproduction number ρ. If a sufficiently large fraction is vaccinated, ρ drops be-
low 1 and the epidemic becomes extinct. The global aviation network can be employed to estimate
the fraction of the global population that needs to be vaccinated in order to prevent the epidemic
from spreading. Fig. 4 demonstrates that a quick response to an initial outbreak is necessary if
global vaccination is to be avoided. The Figure depicts the probability pn(v) of having to vacci-
nate a fraction v of the population if an infected individual is randomly placed in one of the cities
and permitted to travel n = 1, 2 or 3 times. For the majority of originating cities the initial spread
is regionally confined and thus a quick response to an outbreak requires only a vaccination of a
small fraction of the population. However, if the infected individual travels twice, the expected
fraction 〈v〉 of the population which needs to be vaccinated is considerable (74.58%). For n = 3
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Figure 4: Left: Geographical representation of the results two simulations of hypothetical SARS
outbreaks 90 days after an initial infection in (a) New York and (b) London for the same parame-
ters and color code as in Fig. 2. Right: Impact and control of epidemics. The probability pn(v) of
having to vaccinate a fraction v of the population in order to prevent the epidemic from spreading,
if an initial infected individual is permitted to travel n = 1 (red), 2 (blue), and 3 (green) times.
The probability pn(v) is estimated by placing the infected individual on a node i (black dot) of the
network. The fraction vi associated with node i is given by the number of susceptibles in a subnet-
work which can be reached by the infected individual after n = 1, 2 and 3 steps. Histogramming
vi for all nodes i yields an estimate for pn(v). The light-blue curve depicts the strong impact of
isolating only 2% of the largest cities after an initial outbreak (n = 2) and is to be compared to the
blue curve.
global vaccination is necessary.
As a reaction to a new epidemic outbreak, it might be advantageous to impose travel restrictions
to inhibit the spread. Here we compare two strategies: (i) the shutdown of individual connections
and (ii) the isolations of cities. Our simulations show that an isolation of only 2% of the largest
cities already drastically reduces 〈v〉 (with n = 2) from 74.58% to 37.50% (compare the blue and
light-blue curves in Fig. 4). In contrast, a shutdown of the strongest connections in the network is
not nearly as effective. In order to obtain a similar reduction of 〈v〉 the top 27.5% of connections
would need to be taken off the network. Thus, our analysis shows that a remarkable success is
guaranteed if the largest cities are isolated as a response to an outbreak.
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In a globalized world with millions of passengers traveling around the world week by week
infectious diseases may spread rapidly around the world. We believe that a detailed analysis of the
aviation network represents a cornerstone for the development of efficient quarantine strategies to
prevent diseases from spreading. As our model is based on a microscopic description of traveling
individuals our approach may be considered a reference point for the development and simulation
of control strategies for future epidemics.
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